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NO. COA95-1270 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 5 November 1996
GAIL OWENS HUFF,
Plaintiff, v. AUTOS UNLIMITED, INC., a
corporation, DAVID GRANGER and WILLIAM BRITT, d/b/a
K & A BODY SHOP AND AUTO SALES, Defendants.
Appeal by defendants from judgment entered 25 July 1995 by
Judge Wiley F. Bowen in Cumberland County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 August 1996.
Reid, Lewis, Deese, Nance & Person, by James R.
Nance, Jr., for plaintiff-appellee.
Bennett & Blancato, L.L.P., by Rodney A. Guthrie,
for defendants-appellants.
LEWIS, Judge.
Plaintiff commenced this action on 29 June 1994 alleging
fraud, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and violations of
N.C. Gen. Stat. section 20-71.4 and N.C. Gen. Stat. section
20-348. The trial court, sitting without a jury, found
violations of G.S. 20-348 and N.C. Gen. Stat. Chapter 75
("Chapter 75"). Plaintiff was awarded treble damages in the
amount of $7,701.00. Defendants appeal.
At issue in this case is the sale of a 1992 Oldsmobile
Achieva from defendant Autos Unlimited, Inc. ("Autos
Unlimited") to plaintiff on 1 October 1993. Plaintiff
testified that prior to the purchase, Defendant Granger
assured her several times that the car was reliable. He told
her that, although the car had been in a "fender-bender"
causing six hundred dollars in electrical work, it was still a
good car.
Plaintiff further testified that a couple of days after
buying the car, she took it to Triangle Automobiles where she
was told that the car had been severely damaged and was given
a list of the damaged parts. When she confronted defendant
Granger with this list, he denied that the enumerated damages
existed, but agreed to fix anything he found wrong with the
vehicle. When Ms. Huff later picked up the car, Defendant
Granger told her that there was nothing wrong with the
vehicle.
Plaintiff testified that at some point thereafter, the
alternator quit and the axle fell out twice. Ms. Huff
testified after the axle fell out the second time, she did not
use the car again. Ms. Huff confirmed that she was never
informed that the vehicle had been totalled or that it was a
salvaged vehicle. Ms. Huff did acknowledge that she signed an
"as-is" warranty at the time she bought the car.
K.W. Benoit, an inspector with the North Carolina Division
of Motor Vehicles, testified that after receiving a complaint
from Ms. Huff, he ran a computer check on the car. It revealed
that the car Ms. Huff purchased from Autos Unlimited had been
salvaged. Mr. Benoit acknowledged, however, that the title
received by Autos Unlimited did not indicate that the vehicle
was salvaged or reconstructed or that it had ever been
involved in a serious accident.
Mr. Billy Melvin, an employee of Triangle Automobiles,
stated that upon examination of Ms. Huff's vehicle, he noticed
several badly damaged parts. He then ran a computer check
which revealed that the car had been totaled in 1992. It was
Mr. Melvin's testimony that the car was not safe to operate on
the streets of North Carolina. Furthermore, based upon his
thirty-four years in the car business, he opined that any
person experienced in dealing with automobiles should have
known upon looking under the hood that the car had been
significantly damaged.
Defendant David Granger testified that he and his wife have
owned Autos Unlimited since November 1991 and that he has been
in the automobile business since 1981. He further testified
that he knew when he purchased it that the car he sold to Gail
Huff had been wrecked, but that he had not received any
disclosure form indicating that it was a salvaged or
reconstructed vehicle. Mr. Granger testified that he
personally examined the vehicle at the time he purchased it.
He stated that, despite the fact that he had been told the car
had been wrecked, he made no attempt to determine the amount
of damage the vehicle had suffered.
We first note that in violation of Appellate Rule 28(b)(5),
defendants have failed to reference an assignment of error
after either argument presented in their brief. This failure
subjects defendants' appeal to dismissal. Hines v. Arnold
, 103 N.C. App. 31, 37, 404 S.E.2d 179, 183 (1991).
However, exercising our discretion under Appellate Rule 2, we
have chosen to suspend the requirements of Rule 28 since the
assignment of error intended is fairly evident from the
content of the arguments. In doing so, we observe that,
although defendants presented three assignments of error, they
only argue two in their brief. Assignment of error number one
is deemed abandoned. N.C.R. App. P 28(b)(5)(1996).
Defendants argue that the trial court erred in ruling that
their acts were unfair or deceptive trade practices as defined
in Chapter 75. "A practice is unfair when it offends
established public policy as well as when the practice is
immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially
injurious to consumers." Marshall v. Miller , 302 N.C.
539, 548, 276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (1981). "[A] practice is
deceptive if it has the capacity or tendency to deceive; proof
of actual deception is not required." Id . In order to
prevail in a Chapter 75 claim, a plaintiff must show: "(1) an
unfair or deceptive act or practice . . . , (2) in or
affecting commerce, (3) which proximately caused actual injury
to plaintiff or to his business." Spartan Leasing v.
Pollard , 101 N.C. App. 450, 461, 400 S.E.2d 476, 482
(1991). The second requirement, that the act or practice be
"in or affecting commerce," is not at issue in this case.
The trial court's findings of fact in a bench trial are
conclusive on appeal if they are supported by competent
evidence. Foster v. Foster Farms, Inc. , 112 N.C. App.
700, 706, 436 S.E.2d 843, 847 (1993). This is true even though
the evidence might also support contrary findings. Id.
When no assignment of error is made to findings of fact,
they are presumed to be supported by competent evidence and
are binding on appeal. Anderson Chevrolet/Olds v. Higgins
, 57 N.C. App. 650, 653, 292 S.E.2d 159, 161 (1982).
Defendants did not assign error to any of the following
findings of fact. They are therefore presumed to be supported
by competent evidence and are binding on appeal.
8. That the Defendant Granger represented to the Plaintiff
that the vehicle was a reliable and safe vehicle and that the
Plaintiff reasonably relied upon that representation.
9. That the Oldsmobile Achieva was previously a salvaged or
reconstructed vehicle.
10. That the Defendant Autos Unlimited, Inc. through its
servants, agents, and employees and particularly the Defendant
Granger did not disclose to the Plaintiff that the vehicle was
or had been a salvaged or reconstructed vehicle.
* * *
12. That the Plaintiff was misled by the Defendant into
believing that there had not been a substantial change to the
vehicle as a result of accident or damage.
* * *
17. That the Defendant Granger purchased the vehicle for
resale to the public and knew at the time of the purchase that
the vehicle had been wrecked but took no steps to determine
the extent of the damage of the vehicle including a reasonable
inspection of the vehicle itself.
Defendants correctly argue that their failure to conduct a
complete title search cannot subject them to liability under
Chapter 75. See Ramsey v. Keever's Used Cars , 92 N.C.
App. 187, 191, 374 S.E.2d 135, 138 (1988). However, we hold
that the failure to conduct a simple visual inspection of the
car once a dealer knows of its involvement in an accident can
subject the dealer to liability under Chapter 75 under certain
circumstances. In this case, defendants not only failed to
visibly inspect the vehicle with the knowledge that it had
been wrecked, but additionally sold it to a consumer with
assurances of its reliability. These actions are surely
unethical, unscrupulous, substantially injurious to consumers
and have the capacity or tendency to deceive. An automobile
dealer with knowledge that a car he intends to sell has been
wrecked should not escape liability by pleading ignorance
where the damage can be detected by visual inspection; nor
likewise, should he be allowed to sell the same car with
assurances of reliability.
Therefore, the only issue left for our consideration is
whether Ms. Huff suffered an actual injury as a proximate
result of defendants' misrepresentations. This requirement is
clearly satisfied here. The trial court found that the car
purchased by Ms. Huff was neither safe nor reliable and that
she had been misled by defendants into believing otherwise.
The record contains sufficient evidence that the car purchased
from defendants was severely structurally damaged and was not
safe to operate. Furthermore, the record evidence shows that
Ms. Huff purchased this car based on the assurances of
defendant Granger and would not have purchased the car had she
known it was a reconstructed vehicle. The trial court was
correct in concluding that Ms. Huff suffered actual injury as
a proximate result of defendants' misrepresentations.
We therefore affirm the trial court's ruling that
defendants committed unfair and deceptive trade practices in
violation of Chapter 75 of the North Carolina General
Statutes. Accordingly, there is no need to review defendants'
remaining assignment of error since a violation of Chapter 75
is sufficient alone to sustain the treble damages awarded by
the trial court.
Affirmed.
Judges JOHNSON and WYNN concur.
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